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Basic emotional states (such as anger, fear, and joy) can be similarly conveyed by the face, the body, and the voice. Are there humanbrain
regions that represent these emotional mental states regardless of the sensory cues from which they are perceived? To address this
question, in the present study participants evaluated the intensity of emotions perceived from face movements, body movements, or
vocal intonations, while their brain activitywasmeasuredwith functionalmagnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Usingmultivoxel pattern
analysis, we compared the similarity of response patterns across modalities to test for brain regions in which emotion-specific patterns
in onemodality (e.g., faces) couldpredict emotion-specific patterns in anothermodality (e.g., bodies). Awhole-brain searchlight analysis
revealed modality-independent but emotion category-specific activity patterns in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and left superior
temporal sulcus (STS). Multivoxel patterns in these regions contained information about the category of the perceived emotions (anger,
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) across all modality comparisons (face–body, face–voice, body–voice), and independently of the
perceived intensity of the emotions. No systematic emotion-related differences were observed in the overall amplitude of activation in
MPFC or STS. These results reveal supramodal representations of emotions in high-level brain areas previously implicated in affective
processing, mental state attribution, and theory-of-mind. We suggest that MPFC and STS represent perceived emotions at an abstract,
modality-independent level, and thus play a key role in the understanding and categorization of others’ emotional mental states.
Introduction
Successful social interaction requires a precise understanding of
the feelings, intentions, thoughts, and desires of other people.
The importance of understanding other people’s minds is re-
flected in the exceptional ability of humans to infer complex
mental states from subtle sensory cues. In the domain of emotion,
these sensory cues come from various sources, such as facial ex-
pressions, bodymovements, and vocal intonations. For example,
fear can be recognized using visual information from the eye
region of faces, from movements and postures of body parts, as
well as from acoustic changes in voices (de Gelder et al., 2006;
Heberlein and Atkinson, 2009). Despite their disparate sensory
nature, these signals can similarly lead to the recognition of an
emotional state (i.e., that the person is afraid) and activate
similar emotion-specific responses in the observer (Magne´e et
al., 2007). Thus, when evaluating how someone feels, our rep-
resentation of another person’s emotional state (e.g., fear) is
abstracted away from the specific sensory input (e.g., a cow-
ering body posture or a trembling voice). This raises the crit-
ical question of whether there may be brain regions that
encode emotions independently of the modality through
which they are perceived.
In thepresent study,we sought to identifymodality-independent
neural representations of emotional states by recording functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) responses in participants while
they viewed emotional expressions portrayed in three different
perceptual modalities (body, face, and voice). We asked whether
brain regions exist that exhibit patterns of activity that are specific
to the perceived emotional states but independent of the modal-
ity through which these states are perceived.
Wemeasuredbrain activity in 18 volunteerswhile they viewedor
listened to actors expressing 5 different emotions (anger, disgust,
happiness, fear, sadness). Each of these emotions could be expressed
through either 1) body movements with the face obscured
(body), 2) facial expressionswith the body not visible (face), or 3)
vocal intonations without any visual stimulus (voice). After each
stimulus presentation, volunteers were instructed to assess how
intensely they thought the actor was feeling the emotion just
expressed (see Fig. 1 for an overview of the design). Importantly,
while the emotional state of the actor could readily be inferred
from each of the three stimulusmodalities, different sensory cues
must be used for these inferences.
fMRI data were analyzed using multivoxel pattern analysis
(MVPA). This recently developed technique is sensitive to fine-
grained neural representations (Haynes and Rees, 2005; Kami-
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tani and Tong, 2005), and has been
successfully used to reveal, for example,
coding of object category in ventral tem-
poral cortex (Haxby et al., 2001; Peelen et
al., 2009), individual face identity in ante-
rior temporal cortex (Kriegeskorte et al.,
2007), as well as voice identity and voice
prosody in auditory cortices (Formisano
et al., 2008; Ethofer et al., 2009). Using a
spherical searchlight approach (Krieges-
korte et al., 2006), we tested for regions in
the brain where local activity patterns
contained information about the emotion
categories (e.g., fear, anger) independent
of stimulus modality (body, face, voice).
Materials andMethods
Participants. Eighteen healthy adult volunteers
participated in the study (10 women, mean age
26 years, range 20–32). All were right-handed,
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and no history of neurological or psychiatric
disease. Participants all gave informed consent
according to ethics regulations.
Stimuli. Movies of emotional facial expres-
sions were taken from the set created by Banse
and Scherer (1996), and used by Scherer and
Ellgring (2007). Themovies were cropped such
that non-facial body parts were not visible.
Four actors (2 male, 2 female) expressed each
emotion.
Movies of emotional body expressions were
taken fromtheset createdandvalidatedbyAtkin-
son et al. (2004; 2007), and used in Peelen et al.
(2007). The actors wore uniform dark-gray,
tight-fitting clothes and headwear so that all body parts were covered. Facial
features and expressions were not visible. Four actors (2 male, 2 female)
expressed each emotion.
Emotional voice stimuli were taken from the Montreal Affective
Voices set, created and validated by Belin et al. (2008). These stimuli
consisted of short (1 s), nonlinguistic interjections (“aah”) express-
ing different emotions. Four actors (2 male, 2 female) expressed each
emotion.
All stimuli (in all three modalities) were selected to reliably convey the
target emotions, as indicated by prior behavioral studies with the same
material.
Design and procedure. Participants performed 6 fMRI runs, each start-
ing and ending with a 10 s fixation baseline period. Within each run, 36
trials of 8.5 s were presented in 3 blocks of 12 trials (Fig. 1). These blocks
were separated by 5 s fixation periods. The 3 blocks differed in the type of
stimuli presented (bodies, faces, or voices), and each of them included 2
different clips (of different actors) for each of the 5 emotion conditions
(anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness) and a neutral condition (not
included in the analyses, see below). Trials were presented in random
order within each block, such that the emotion category itself could not
be predicted before stimulus onset. The order of blocks was counterbal-
anced across runs. Each run lasted5 min 40 s.
Each trial consisted of a 2 s fixation cross, followed by a 3 s movie or
sound clip, a 1 s blank screen, and a 2.5 s response window. Because the
sound clips were shorter than the movie clips, an extra empty time was
added after the sound clips to equate the timing across conditions. After
the presentation of each stimulus, participants were asked to rate the
intensity of the emotional expression on a 3-point scale. This task was
chosen to encourage participants to actively evaluate the perceived emo-
tional states, because explicit judgments may increase activity in key
brain regions involved in social cognition and mental state attribution
(Adolphs, 2009; Lee and Siegle, 2009; Zaki et al., 2009). In addition, in
contrast to a direct emotion categorization task, the intensity judgment
task has the advantage that it decouples the button press responses from
the emotion categories since it requires the same responses for all emo-
tion categories. For example, after an angry bodymovie, the responsewas
cued by the following text display: “Angry? 1—a little, 2—quite, 3—very
much,” where “1”, “2”, “3” referred to 3 response buttons [from left to
right; for half the participants this response mapping was reversed (from
right to left)] on a keypad held in the right hand.Hence, the planning and
execution of motor responses were fully orthogonal to the emotion cat-
egories (i.e., the same responses had to be selected for all categories and
all modalities), such that motor selection processes could not confound
any differential activity across emotions. For the neutral condition, par-
ticipants rated how “lively” the movie was. The neutral conditions were
not further analyzed due to a relative ambiguity of these expressions in
this context, and the low intensity ratings for the neutral conditions
(mean intensity rating: 1.76) relative to the emotion conditions (mean
intensity rating: 2.24). Due to technical problems, responses could not be
recorded in one participant.
Data acquisition. Scanning was performed on a 3T Siemens Trio Tim
MRI scanner at the Center for Bio-Medical Imaging, University Hospital
of Geneva. For functional scans, a single-shot echoplanar imaging se-
quence was used (T2* weighted, gradient echo sequence), with the fol-
lowing parameters: TR (repetition time) 2490ms, TE (echo time) 30
ms, 36 off-axial slices, voxel dimensions: 1.8  1.8 mm, 3.6 mm slice
thickness (no gap). Anatomical images were acquired using a T1-
weighted sequence, with parameters: TR/TE: 2200 ms/3.45 ms; slice
thickness 1 mm; in-plane resolution: 1 1 mm.
Data preprocessing.Data were analyzed using the AFNI software pack-
age andMATLAB (TheMathWorks). All functional data were slice-time
corrected, motion corrected, and low-frequency drifts were removed
with a temporal high-pass filter (cutoff of 0.006 Hz). Data were spatially
smoothedwith aGaussian kernel (4mm full-width half-maximum). The
Figure1. Schematic overviewof the design. Each run consisted of 3 blocks of 12 trials each. Blocks differed in the type of stimuli
presented (bodies, faces, or voices). On each trial, one of five different emotions could be expressed in a givenmodality. These trials
were presented in random order within each block, whereas the order of blocks was counterbalanced across runs. Each trial
consisted of a 2 s fixation cross, followed by a 3 s stimulus (movie or sound clip), a 1 s blank screen, and then a 2.5 s response
window. After the presentation of each stimulus, participants were asked to rate the intensity of the perceived emotion on a
3-point scale. Not drawn to scale.
10128 • J. Neurosci., July 28, 2010 • 30(30):10127–10134 Peelen et al. • Supramodal Representations of Emotions
three-dimensional anatomical scans were transformed into Talairach
space, and the parameters from this transformation were subsequently
applied to the coregistered functional data, which were resampled to 3
mm isotropic voxels. All analyses were restricted to voxels that fell within
the anatomical brain volume.
fMRI data analysis. Information-based brain mapping by means of a
spherical searchlight was used to analyze the fMRI data (Kriegeskorte et
al., 2006). This technique exploits differences in multivoxel activity pat-
terns to determine which brain areas differentiate among the experimen-
tal conditions. Multivoxel pattern analysis was performed on parameter
estimates (s), which were extracted using standard regression analysis
[generalized linear model (GLM)]. For the GLM, events were defined as
the 4 s period starting with the onset of themovie or sound clip, and thus
excluding the part of the trial where the response screen was shown (a
control analysis was performed with conditions modeled relative to the
response screen; see Results). These events were convolved with a stan-
dard model of the hemodynamic response function. A general linear
model was created with one predictor for each condition of interest.
Regressors of no interest were also included to account for differences in
mean magnetic resonance (MR) signal across scans and participants.
Regressors were fitted to theMR time-series in each voxel and the result-
ing  parameter estimates were used to estimate the magnitude of re-
sponse to the experimental conditions.
For each voxel in the brain we extracted, for each stimulus condition,
the multivoxel pattern of activation in a sphere of 8 mm radius (corre-
sponding to 81 resampled voxels) around this voxel. In other words, each
of the 15 conditions (5 emotions  3 modalities) was associated with a
unique multivoxel pattern of s in each sphere. These 15 patterns were
then correlated with each other, resulting in a symmetrical 15  15
correlation matrix. These correlations reflect the similarity between the
activation patterns of each pair of experimental conditions. The correla-
tion values from each sphere were Fisher transformed (0.5 * loge((1 
r)/(1  r))) and assigned to the center voxel of the sphere. To test for
modality-independent emotion representations, we analyzed the corre-
lations that resulted from the pairing of the different modalities (face–
voice, body–voice, body–face). For the whole-brain searchlight analysis,
the within-emotion correlations (e.g., fearful body—fearful voice) were
averaged to provide one estimate of within-emotion similarity. Similarly,
the between-emotion correlations (e.g., fearful body—happy voice)
were averaged to provide one estimate of between-emotion similarity.
Finally, a random-effects whole-brain group analysis (N 18) was per-
formed using spatially normalized data to test for spheres with signifi-
cantly stronger correlations within emotion categories than between
emotion categories. Importantly, the sensory dissimilarity between these
two comparisons is identical, and any significant differences between
these correlations were therefore due to the emotional state perceived
from the stimuli.
The appropriate statistical threshold was determined using Monte
Carlo simulation. 100 simulations were performed on the same data
using the same searchlight analysis as described above, but with the 15
condition labels shuffled before computing the correlations. At anuncor-
rected threshold of p 0.001 and a cluster-size threshold of 20 (resampled)
contiguous voxels, 100 simulations revealed a total of 2 significant activation
clusters, conservatively estimating the false-positive probability (2/100)
at p 0.05.
Results
Behavioral results
Participants rated the intensity of the perceived emotions on a
3-point scale, ranging from 1 (“a little”) to 3 (“very much”). The
average rating for the five emotion conditions was 2.24 (Fig. 2),
and comparable for the three modalities (face: 2.13, body:
2.31; voice: 2.27). A 5 (Emotion)  3 (Modality) ANOVA on
these ratings showed a significant interaction between Emo-
tion and Modality ( p  0.001), indicating that differences be-
tween the perceived intensities of emotions depended on
modality. For example, disgust was perceived as more intense in
the body condition (2.44) than the voice condition (1.95; p 
0.005). Conversely, anger was perceived as more intense in the
voice (2.48) than the body condition (2.21; p 0.01). The Emo-
tionModality interaction indicates that differences in the per-
ceived intensity of the emotions were not consistent across
modality, and thus that any supramodal emotion-specific effects
in subsequent fMRI analyseswere unlikely to be due to systematic
differences in perceived intensity. To confirm the absence of sys-
tematic emotion-related differences in perceived intensity, the
emotion-related variations in the ratings were correlated across
modalities. If some emotions were consistently (i.e., for multiple
modalities) rated asmore or less intense than the other emotions,
this would be reflected in positive correlations between the rat-
ings for different modalities. Correlations were computed for
each participant separately, Fisher transformed, and tested
against zero. None of the correlations were significantly positive
(body–face: r 0.15, p 0.2; body–voice: r0.29, p 0.07;
face–voice: r 0.08, p 0.6). In summary, there was no evidence
for emotion-specific variations in intensity ratings that were con-
sistent across modalities. This excludes the possibility that differ-
ences in perceived intensity (or other rating-related differences
such as the planning and execution of motor responses) could
provide an alternative explanation for supramodal emotion-
specific fMRI responses.
fMRI results
The searchlight analysis revealed two clusters that showed signif-
icant supramodal emotion information ( pcorr0.05, corrected
for multiple comparisons; see Materials and Methods). The first
was located in rostralMPFC [peak coordinates (x, y, z): 11, 48, 17;
t17 6.0, p 0.00001] (Fig. 3). The second cluster was located in
left posterior superior temporal sulcus [STS; peak coordinates
(x, y, z):47,62, 8, t17 6.4, p 0.00001; Fig. 3]. In both areas,
the patterns of neural activity associated with the same emotions
perceived from different, nonoverlapping, stimulus types (body,
face, voice) were more similar to each other than were the pat-
terns associated with different emotions, again perceived from
different stimulus types (Fig. 3; supplemental Fig. 1, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). In other words,
these regions showed remarkably consistent activity patterns that
followed the emotional content thatwas inferred from the stimuli
independent of the specific sensory cues that conveyed the emo-
tion. Finally, ANOVAs revealed that in both MPFC and STS, the
strength of this effect was equally strong for the three modality
comparisons (face–voice, body–voice, body–face; p  0.1, for
both regions), and the five emotion categories ( p 0.07, for both
regions).
To test whether supramodal emotion information (again de-
fined as the average within-emotion across-modality correlation
versus the average between-emotion across-modality correla-
Figure 2. Average intensity ratings for each experimental condition. ang, Anger; dis, dis-
gust; fea, fear; hap, happiness; sad, sadness.
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tion) in the peak spheres of MPFC and STS were modulated by
the perceived intensity of the emotions, the multivoxel pattern
analysis was repeated on two halves of the data, divided based on
the participants’ intensity ratings. For each participant and stim-
ulus condition separately, the trial that was rated the lowest in
each run was assigned to the “low rated” condition whereas the
trial that was rated the highest was assigned to the “high rated”
condition. (Each condition (e.g., fearful bodies) appeared twice
in a run, expressed by different actors, so that high- and low-rated
trials appeared with a similar history and distribution over the
entire experiment.) When both trials were rated equally (or if no
response was collected for one or both trials) the trials were ran-
domly assigned to the conditions, which was true for, on average,
53% of the trials. The mean intensity rating of the high-rated
condition (2.46) was indeed substantially higher than the mean
intensity rating of the low-rated condition (1.85). Despite this
difference in perceived intensity, the difference between the su-
pramodal emotion information in multivoxel activity patterns for
high-rated versus low-rated trialswas not significant in either region
( p 0.3, for both spheres), indicating that both the low- and high-
rated trials contributed to the overall emotion information ob-
served. However, it should be emphasized that our stimulus set was
purposefully chosen to a have relatively “high” expressivity and thus
be reliably recognized, such that the overall variability in ratings
mighthavebeen insufficient to reveal intensity-relateddifferences in
this subsidiary analysis.
In the above analyses, conditions were modeled relative to
stimulus presentation, excluding the part of the trial where the
response screen was shown. However, given the close temporal
proximity of stimulus and response screen, it cannot be excluded
that the emotion-specific activity patterns observed may have
been partly related to the processing of the response screen (e.g.,
related to the written labels of the emotions). To test for this
possibility, we ran a control analysis, now specifically modeling
the conditions relative to the 2.5 s presentation of the response
screen. The same contrast that revealed strong emotion-specific
information when conditions were modeled relative to stimulus
presentation (Fig. 3) failed to reveal any significant clusters when
conditions were modeled relative to response-screen presenta-
tion. This was true even when the threshold was lowered to p
0.01 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons). Furthermore, the
peak spheres in MPFC and STS, which showed highly significant
emotion-specific information during stimulus presentation, did
not contain any such information during the presentation of the
response screen ( p 0.3, for both spheres). These analyses show
that the effects inMPFC and STSwere related to the processing of
the emotional body, face, and voice stimuli rather than to the
processing of the response screen.
Mean activation in searchlight clusters
Mean activation levels were extracted from the searchlight clus-
ters inMPFC and STS. None of the stimulus conditions activated
the clusters significantly above baseline (Fig. 4), which is com-
monly observed due to high activation in these regions during
resting states (Mitchell et al., 2002).Nevertheless, in both regions,
a 5 (Emotion) 3 (Modality) ANOVAonparameter estimates of
activation showed a significant interaction between Emotion and
Modality ( p 0.05, for both regions), indicating that the activa-
tion differences between the emotions differed for the 3 modali-
ties. To test whether there were emotion-specific activation
differences that were consistent across modality, we tested
whether themean activations (as estimated by values) inMPFC
and STS weremore similar within than between emotion catego-
ries. First, for each participant, the response magnitudes in the
three modalities were mean-centered such that the mean re-
sponses to the three modalities were identical, leaving only
emotion-related variability. Subsequently, the absolute differ-
ence between responses to the same emotion across modalities
(e.g., fearful faces vs fearful bodies) were computed, and com-
pared with the absolute difference between responses to different
Figure 3. Results of a whole-brain searchlight analysis showing clusters with significant emotion-specific activity patterns across modality. Similarity of activity patterns was expressed as a
correlation value, with higher correlations indicating higher similarity. Patterns were generally more similar within emotion categories (green bars) than between emotion categories (blue bars).
Top row: Cluster inMPFC; peak (x, y, z): 11, 48, 17; t17 6.0, p 0.00001, and average Fisher-transformed correlation values inMPFC cluster for the three cross-modality comparisons. Correlations
were higher forwithin- than between-emotion comparisons for all threemodality combinations ( p 0.05, for all tests). Bottom row: Cluster in left STS; peak (x, y, z):47,62, 8, t17 6.4, p
0.00001, and average Fisher-transformed correlation values in STS cluster for the three cross-modality comparisons. Correlationswere higher forwithin- than between-emotion comparisons for all
threemodality combinations ( p 0.05, for all tests). ang, Anger; dis, disgust; fea, fear; hap, happiness; sad, sadness; all, average across the five emotions. Error bars indicate within-subject SEM.
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emotions across modalities (e.g., fearful faces vs disgusted bod-
ies). If the mean  values carried emotion-specific information,
the average within-emotion response difference should be
smaller than the average between-emotion response difference.
This was, however, not the case. The average within-emotion
response difference was equivalent to the average between-
emotion response difference for all three modality pairs in both
the MPFC and STS ( p 0.05, for all tests). Thus, in contrast to
the multivariate measure (multivoxel correlation), which carried
reliable emotion-specific information across modality, the uni-
variate measure (based on mean response amplitude) did not
provide such modality-independent emotion information.
Overlap of STS searchlight cluster with face- and
body-responsive STS
The lowoverall activity in the left STS cluster (Fig. 4) suggests that
it may differ from those STS regions previously found to show
strong stimulus-driven responses tomoving faces and bodies (for
review, see Allison et al., 2000). To directly test for any overlap
between face- and body-responsive voxels in left STS and the
searchlight STS cluster showing emotion-specific patterns [peak
coordinates (x, y, z): 47, 62, 8)] we contrasted the face and
body conditions against baseline. Faces activated a cluster in left
STS (62,34, 2, t17 7.5, p 0.00001) that was anterior to the
searchlight STS cluster. Bodies activated two regions in left STS
(posterior: 50, 50, 4, t17  5.4, p  0.0001; anterior: 53,
35, 1, t17  4.8, p  0.0005) that were also both located
anterior to the searchlight cluster. Finally, there was no overlap
between the searchlight STS cluster and any of the face- or body-
responsive clusters, even at an uncorrected threshold of p 0.01.
This finding suggests that the supramodal
emotion-specific STS area identified by the
searchlight analysis did not correspond to
movement-selective regions observed in
studies of face or body perception.
Univariate supramodalemotion specificity
A whole-brain univariate group analysis
was performed to test for regions in which
overall activity was selective for one of the
five emotions independent of modality.
Each of the 5 emotions was contrasted
with the average of the 4 others, initially
combining the data from the 3modalities.
At p  0.001 (uncorrected, cluster size
20 voxels), no regions were selectively activated by any of the 5
emotions (averaged across the 3 modalities). At a more lenient
threshold of p  0.005 (uncorrected, cluster size 10 voxels),
several regions showed emotion-specific activity for disgust, fear,
or happiness (Table 1). Next, we tested whether the emotion
specificity in these regions was driven by one of themodalities, or
was independent of modality and significant for each of the 3
modalities separately. Of these regions, only the fear-specific re-
gion in left middle frontal gyrus showed significant emotion
specificity (at p 0.05) for all three modalities separately (Table
1). The absence of amygdala activity for the contrast ‘fear vs other
emotions’ is in line with previous work showing that this region
responds tomultiple emotion categories when these are matched
for perceived intensity (Winston et al., 2003). These data therefore
indicate that category-specific modality-independent activations
could not be reliably observed in standard univariate subtractive
analysis, with the possible exception of fear-specificity in left middle
frontal gyrus.
Discussion
Our results show that multivoxel patterns of activity in two cor-
tical brain regions,MPFCand left STS, carried information about
emotion categories regardless of the specific sensory cues (body,
face, voice). No consistent differences were found between the
perceived intensity of different emotion categories, ruling out the
possibility that the emotion-specific activity patterns in MPFC
and STS were related to systematic differences in the intensity of
the different emotions. Furthermore, there were no consistent
differences between emotion categories in the averagemagnitude
of activity in these regions, indicating a similar overall recruit-
ment of MPFC and STS in processing the different types of emo-
tions. Critically, activity patterns inMPFC and STS distinguished
between the emotion categories even across different visual cues
(body versus face) and different sensory modalities (body/face
versus voice). These findings therefore provide evidence for
modality-independent but emotion-specific representations in
MPFC and STS, regions previously implicated in affective pro-
cessing, mental state attribution, and theory-of-mind. Below, we
discuss the implications of these new findings in the context of
previous research, and propose questions for future research.
Converging evidence points to an important role forMPFC in
mental state attribution, including emotions (Frith and Frith,
2003; Mitchell, 2009; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). For ex-
ample,MPFC activity has been reported duringmentalizing tasks
involving the attribution of beliefs or intentions to protagonists
in stories and cartoons (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al.,
2000; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Vo¨llm et al., 2006), the incorpo-
ration of the thinking of others in strategic reasoning (Coricelli
Figure 4. Mean activation (parameter estimates) in MPFC (left) and STS (right) searchlight clusters for each experimental
condition. Abbreviations are as in Figure 2.
Table 1. Regions showing univariate emotion-selective responses across the 3
modalities (F B V), and significance for the same contrasts within these
regions for each of themodalities separately
Talairach
coordinates F B V Face Body Voice
Disgust vs other
emotions
Brainstem 1,35,24 p 0.001 p 0.001 NS p 0.01
Fear vs other
emotions
Left MFG 43, 14, 38 p 0.001 p 0.05 p 0.05 p 0.01
Happiness vs other
emotions
Right ACC 5, 43,4 p 0.001 NS p 0.005 p 0.05
Right Occipital 18,92, 2 p 0.001 NS p 0.001 NS
Right ATL 38, 1,21 p 0.001 NS p 0.05 p 0.05
FBV, Facebody voice;MFG,middle frontal gyrus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; ATL, anterior temporal
lobe.
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and Nagel, 2009), and the attribution of emotions to seen faces
(Schulte-Ru¨ther et al., 2007). MPFC is reliably activated in stud-
ies of emotion perception using different stimulus types, as well
as in studies of emotion experience (Bush et al., 2000; Kober et al.,
2008; Adolphs, 2009), particularly when participants evaluate
emotional states (Lane et al., 1997; Reiman et al., 1997; Lee and
Siegle, 2009; Zaki et al., 2009). Finally, activity in MPFC was
found to be directly related to the accuracy of attributions made
about another person’s emotions, suggesting an important role
for this region in the evaluation and understanding of affective
states (Zaki et al., 2009).Our present finding of supramodal emo-
tion representations in MPFC provides new evidence that this
region is an important part of the brain network involved in the
recognition, categorization, and understanding of others’ emo-
tions. Critically, the present study is the first to show that MPFC
encodes information related to the particular content of the emo-
tional state observed in others. This finding speaks to a principal
question regarding the possible role of MPFC in mental state
attribution: whether this region maintains specific representa-
tions ofmental states or, instead, whether its activity duringmen-
tal state attribution reflects content-general processes. For
example, it has been hypothesized that the key function ofMPFC
may be captured by particular cognitive processes such as direct-
ing attention to one’s own or others’mental states (Gallagher and
Frith, 2003), the evaluation of internally generated information
(Christoff and Gabrieli, 2000), or projecting oneself into worlds
that differ mentally, temporally, or physically from one’s current
experience (Mitchell, 2009). One interpretation of these process-
oriented accounts is that MPFC may activate whenever the hy-
pothesized process (e.g., directing attention to mental states) is
implicated, for example to access representations of emotions
stored in other brain regions. While at a macroscopic level the
function of MPFC may be described in terms of particular cog-
nitive processes, the current finding of content-specific MPFC
activity patterns suggests that at a finer-grained level this region
may contain distinct representations corresponding to the con-
tent used in these processes. More generally, the macroscopic
organization of cortical areas may follow particular processes or
computations, while the specific content involved in these com-
putations may be represented at a finer-grained level of cortical
organization within these regions (Peelen et al., 2006; Mur et al.,
2009). The recent interest and development in high-resolution
fMRI andmultivariate analysis methods (Haynes and Rees, 2006;
Norman et al., 2006) can be expected to provide increasing evi-
dence for such fine-grained representations within larger-scale
functional brain areas.
A second brain area showing supramodal emotion specificity
in the present study was the left posterior STS. Similar to MPFC,
multivoxel activity patterns in this region carried information
about perceived emotional states. Interestingly, previous re-
search has linked the posterior STS, along with the MPFC, to
mentalizing and “theory of mind”. For example, patients with
selective damage to left STS and left temporoparietal junction
(TPJ) are impaired in understanding the mental states of others
(Samson et al., 2004), indicating that this regionmay be critically
involved in this process. Several fMRI studies have also impli-
cated the posterior STS/TPJ in the understanding of others’
minds (Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Decety
and Greze`s, 2006; Gobbini et al., 2007). This region seems func-
tionally similar to the MPFC in that it activates when reasoning
about others’ mental states, but is also functionally dissimilar in
that it is not recruited when reasoning about one’s own mental
states (Saxe et al., 2006). In accordwith these notions, the left STS
region showing significant supramodal emotion specificity in our
study appears to overlap with regions previously implicated in
mentalizing and theory-of-mind (cf. Box 1 in Decety and Greze`s,
2006). By contrast, the left STS identifiedhere appears to differ from
more anterior parts of STS that contain multisensory sectors acti-
vated by voices and faces, as well as their combined presentation
(Beauchamp et al., 2004; Kreifelts et al., 2009). Likewise, other stud-
ies found selective responses in (mostly right) STS to biological
movements, such as facial expressions, body movements, and
point-light biologicalmotion displays (Puce et al., 1998; Greze`s et
al., 1999; Allison et al., 2000; Grossman et al., 2000; Haxby et al.,
2000; Vaina et al., 2001; Peelen et al., 2006; Engell and Haxby,
2007; Gobbini et al., 2007). Although the emotion-specific STS
cluster in our study was located nearby these regions implicated
in “social vision”, it appeared to be distinct from them: first, the
overall magnitude of BOLD responses to body and face movie
clips in this cluster were not significantly above baseline, contrary
to what is typically found in the face- and body-selective STS
regions; second, directly contrasting the face and body conditions
with baseline gave significant STS activation in regions anterior
to the emotion-specific searchlight STS cluster and these regions
did not overlap. However, it should be noted that to directly
establish the anatomical and functional correspondence of the
current STS regionwith regions previously implicated in the pro-
cessing of body and face stimuli, and with those implicated in
mentalizing and theory-of-mind, requires comparisons in the
same group of participants, and using the same analysis methods
(Gobbini et al., 2007; Bahnemann et al., 2010).
The current findings showed a high degree of emotion speci-
ficity in multivoxel fMRI patterns in MPFC and left STS. What
could be the degree of specificity at the neuronal level? One pos-
sibility consistent with our findings is that these regions contain
individual neurons that selectively represent emotion categories
at an abstract level. A comparable degree of specificity for other
categories has been found in the human medial temporal lobe
(MTL) using intracranial recordings. For example, the activity of
neurons in MTL selectively correlates with abstract concepts
(e.g., “MarilynMonroe”) independent of how these concepts are
cued (Quiroga et al., 2005; Quian Quiroga et al., 2009). It is
conceivable that neurons in MPFC and/or STS may show a sim-
ilarly sparse tuning for discrete emotion categories. Such tuning
may be limited to the basic emotion categories used here (Oatley
and Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ekman, 1992), or may possibly extend
to other emotions (e.g., guilt, contempt, shame), nonemotional
mental states, or even conceptual representations more generally
(Binder et al., 2009). Alternatively, it is possible that neurons in
MPFC and/or STS may code for particular emotion dimensions
(Russell, 1980), specific emotion components (novelty, pleasant-
ness, relevance, etc.) (Scherer, 1984), or action tendencies asso-
ciated with emotions (Frijda, 1987). Future experiments are
needed to dissociate between these scenarios (Anderson et al.,
2003), which would in turn help to test the predictions of differ-
ent psychological theories of emotion.
Our findings open upmany new questions that can be directly
addressed by future work using the same methodology. First, do
MPFC and/or STS represent other (emotional and nonemo-
tional) mental states than those tested in our study? Second, to
what extent is emotion specificity in these areas related to the
explicit evaluation of the emotions? For example, does emotion
specificity persist when stimuli are presented outside the focus of
attention (Vuilleumier et al., 2001), or when emotion is task ir-
relevant (Critchley et al., 2000; Winston et al., 2003)? Finally, are
MPFC and/or STS similarly activated by perceived and experi-
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enced emotions? That is, is there an overlap in the representation
of perceived and self-experienced emotions (Reiman et al., 1997),
such that evaluating another’s emotion and experiencing this
same emotion are reflected in corresponding fMRI activity pat-
terns in these regions? These are outstanding questions with
broad theoretical and philosophical implications that can now be
addressed.
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